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STATE TO ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2033
TAGS: [MTCRE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [PK](#) [KS](#)
SUBJECT: CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREAN FIRM
AND ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH PAKISTAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM (S)

REF: SECSTATE 123791

Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (B), (C), and (D).

11. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 5.

12. (U) Poloff met Young-kul Koh of the Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) on December 10 regarding reftel. While Koh understood our concerns, he said that the ROKG did not uncover evidence supporting USG claims. Therefore, the USG would need to provide concrete evidence warranting ROKG action.

13. (S) After poloffs communicated USG concerns about United Engineering in March 2008, MOFAT instructed its Embassy in Pakistan to investigate the firm and the end-use declaration filed by Sambu Korea Tek Co, LTD for the previous items it sold to United Engineering. Koh permitted poloff to review the Embassy report, which it submitted in August 2008. The investigation included a site inspection, interviews with management and employees, and photographic analysis. United Engineering's owner denied any linkage with Pakistan's Project Management Organization (PMO), which is involved in the development and deployment of Pakistan's HATF-III missile, which is a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I system. Employees denied or did not know if United Engineering had any relationship to Pakistan's PMO. In addition, the previously purchased items, (the exported items were positively identified), were installed in the location and in accordance with the information in the end-use declaration. Finally, United Engineering prepared a physical site for newly ordered items (possibly lathes) in accordance with their proper installation and operation.

14. (S) While the report noted that it could not exclude with 100% certainty that United Engineering was not a supplier to Pakistan's PMO, it was "highly likely that the imported items are used in accordance with the end-use declaration." Given its investigation, Koh conceded that United Engineering may be using Intralink Incorporated as an intermediary to acquire the lathes. However, neither has the ROK uncovered nor the USG presented concrete evidence on Intralink's relationship to United Engineering, United Engineering's improper use of the acquired machinery, or United Engineering's relationship with Pakistan's PMO.

15. (S) Consequently, the ROKG requests the following:

-- Concrete evidence that the exported items would be used in ways contrary to the end use declaration or MCTR, since the items are not controlled by any of the multilateral control regimes.

-- Concrete evidence that Intralink is an intermediary for United Engineering.

-- Concrete evidence on the type and nature of relationship
between United Engineering and Pakistan's PMO.
STEPHENS